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Abstract
The observed 2% long run ination target in most developed industrial nations is in
variance with the zero or negative optimal ination rates predicted by prominent mone-
tary theories. Using a calibrated simple New-Keynesian model with endogenous growth and
nominal rigidity, we compare two price setting environments of Calvo (1983) and Rotem-
berg (1982). In our growth model, the steady state welfare maximizing ination takes
into account the growth e¤ect as well as the price distortionary e¤ects of ination. The
long-run welfare maximizing trend ination could be positive in economies with nominal
rigidity in the form of partial ination indexation and price stickiness. A higher degree of
ination indexation lowers the steady state price distortion in the Calvo model and steady
state price adjustment cost in Rotemberg model and raises the long run optimal ination.
Since the productive ine¢ ciency caused by partial ination indexation is higher in Calvo
economy compared to Rotemberg, the long run optimal trend ination is higher in Rotem-
berg than in Calvo. In both models, a two percent long run ination target is attainable
for a reasonable degree of ination indexation.
Key words:
Ination Target, Partial Ination Indexation, Endogenous Growth, Calvo Pricing,
Rotemberg Pricing.
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1. Introduction
In major industrial nations, Central Banks set a long run ination target around
2%. The well known Friedman rule mandates a negative ination rate for the nominal
interest rate to be zero. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) andWoodford (2003) depart
from this Friedman rule and argue that the optimal ination rate is zero in reasonable
economic environments. This gives rise to an anomaly because in reality the long
run ination target (known as trend ination) is positive and around 2% for major
industrial and emerging market economies.
This paper aims to revisit this issue in a New Keynesian endogenous growth
setting. The focus of this paper is purely on long run growth and welfare implications
of trend ination and that is why we abstract from any aggregate shocks to the
economy. Even though there is a rapidly growing literature on trend ination,1 little
e¤ort is directed to understand the long run growth and welfare e¤ects of a positive
ination targeting in the presence of nominal and real frictions in the economy. In
our model, the link between trend ination and growth is in the form of imperfect
ination indexation. If ination is not fully indexed, a higher trend ination by
lowering the price-marginal cost markup could redistribute income from monopolistic
prot to rental income earners. Through this income redistribution channel, trend
ination could positively impact long run growth. The quantitative e¤ect of trend
ination on growth depends crucially on the nature of price setting which is the
central theme of this study.2
As in Ascari and Rossi (2012), we analyze two types of price setting behav-
iour, namely (i) Calvo (1983) where rms randomly reset prices, and (ii) Rotemberg
(1982) where all rms continuously set prices subject to some price adjustment costs.
Growth e¤ects of a trend ination are very di¤erent in these two price setting envi-
ronments. As in King and Wolman (1996), a higher trend ination has an ambiguous
1See Ascari and Sbordone (2014) for a comprehensive survey.
2The positive e¤ect of trend ination on growth via capital accumulation resembles the Tobin
(1965) e¤ect although the mechanism in our model is very di¤erent. In Tobin (1965), a higher
ination causes reallocation of portfolio from money to capital while in our setting, a higher trend
ination could redistribute income from prot to rental income due to long run nominal rigidity.
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e¤ect on the average price-marginal cost markup of monopolistic intermediate goods
rms in a Calvo price setting world. This happens due to the tension between price
adjustment and marginal markup e¤ects. In the Calvo model, this ambiguity trans-
lates into a hump shaped relation between long run growth and trend ination. On
the other hand, in a Rotemberg price setting environment, higher trend ination
unambiguously erodes the average markup of the intermediate goods rms along the
same transmission channel described in Ascari and Rossi (2012) and promotes long
run growth via boosting the rental price of capital.3
The e¤ect of trend ination on the steady state welfare depends not only on how
the trend ination impacts long run growth but also on how the trend ination inu-
ences the price distortion. In the Calvo model, the price distortion arises due to the
dispersion of prices among sticky and exible price rms. In Rotemberg model, the
price distortion arises solely due to the price adjustment costs. In both models, price
distortion by causing productive ine¢ ciency and loss of resources engenders adverse
wealth e¤ect on the representative household and depresses steady state welfare. Af-
ter factoring the growth and price distortionary e¤ects, our calibrated growth model
still yields a positive welfare maximizing ination in both models. As in Lombardo
and Vestin (2008) the ine¢ ciency due to nominal rigidity is higher in the Calvo
model than in Rotemberg. The relative output loss in Calvo model progressively
rises when the trend ination is higher. This makes the welfare maximizing trend
ination lower in the Calvo model compared to the Rotemberg model. The imme-
diate implication is that the optimal long run ination is higher in the Rotemberg
model than in the Calvo model. Both models yield a positive optimal long run an-
nual ination rate. A sensitivity analysis of welfare maximizing ination shows that
the optimal ination is very sensitive to the degree of ination indexation. Higher
ination indexation raises the optimal ination rate in both models because more
indexation of ination dampens the price distortionary e¤ects. In addition, the de-
3Ascari and Rossi (2012) provide useful insights about the di¤erential e¤ects of Calvo and
Rotemberg models of price xing but they do not address the issue of welfare maximizing trend
ination in an endogenous growth setting as we do.
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gree of competition also plays an important role in determining the optimal trend
ination.
In our growth model, the optimality of positive trend ination rests on a com-
parison across ine¢ cient steady states. Two types of ine¢ ciencies are present in
the steady state of our model economy. The rst ine¢ ciency is due to market im-
perfection while the second ine¢ ciency results from nominal rigidity. A zero trend
ination eliminates the second ine¢ ciency but could not overcome the rst ine¢ -
ciency. We demonstrate that in such a second best environment, a small amount of
trend ination could be welfare improving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we review
the relevant literature on trend ination. In section 3, we lay out the basic setup
and compare the balanced growth and long run welfare properties of Calvo and
Rotemberg models. Section 4 reports the calibration. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
There is a substantial literature that rationalizes the benet of a positive trend
ination. Svensson (1997) and Mishkin (2004) argue that a higher trend ination
could reduce ination volatility and the impact of shocks. Blanchard et al. (2010)
and Williams (2009) argue that in the presence of a zero lower bound (ZLB) for
the nominal interest rate, a higher long run ination target gives the Central Bank
greater latitude to lower the nominal interest rate. Billi (2011) develops a small open
economy new Keynesian model with ZLB for the nominal interest rate and argues
that the long run ination target is very low if the government commits in advance
to a future policy plan. On the other hand, if the government follows discretion,
the long run ination target could be inordinately high. Ascari and Sbordone (2014)
undertake a comprehensive analysis of the adverse e¤ect of a higher trend ination
on the stability of the aggregate economy. A higher trend ination shrinks the region
of determinacy of the model. In view of this result, they caution about the pitfall of
a positive ination target to mitigate the ZLB problem.
Although this literature provides useful insights about the rationale for a positive
trend ination, it does not factor into account the long run growth consequences of a
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positive ination target because of not including capital stock as a reproducible input.
Ascari and Sbordone (2014) note that little work has been done on the e¤ects of trend
ination on the aggregate economy with capital. Our novelty is to understand the
welfare consequence of trend ination via the growth channel which necessitates the
use of an endogenous growth model. Since the thrust of this paper is on the e¤ect of
trend ination on long run growth and welfare, unlike Ascari and Sbordone (2014),
we abstract from the e¤ect of trend ination on the volatility and stability of the
economy and only focus on the balanced growth path using a deterministic model
of endogenous growth with a simple "AK" technology as in Rebelo (1991). Our
model connects to a growing literature that highlights the di¤erence between Calvo
and Rotemberg price settings. Ascari and Rossi (2012) focus on the long run new
Keynesian Phillips curve. Damjanovic and Nolan (2010), and Leith and Liu (2014)
focus on optimal ination. However, these models do not look into growth e¤ects of
monetary policy.
Although the primary thrust of our paper is on optimal trend ination in an
endogenous growth model, our model has indirect implications for the relationship
between long run growth and ination. There is an old thread of literature which
studies the cross country relation between growth and ination. The nexus between
growth and ination is still an unsettled question. Kormendi and Meguire (1985)
use cross country data to establish that the long run average growth and long run
ination rate are negatively correlated. Sala-i-Martin (1997) nds rather negligible
e¤ect of ination on growth for their cross country growth regression. In our context,
the e¤ect of trend ination on growth depends on the price setting environment.
There is also a sparse literature exploring the growth and welfare e¤ects of in-
ation in a new Keynesian endogenous growth setting. Amano, Carter and Moran
(2012) have a rich endogenous growth model with nominal price and wage rigidities
and nd that the negative growth and welfare e¤ects of ination primarily arise from
the distortionary e¤ects of ination on labour supply. Their model basically high-
lights the welfare loss of ination and thus unable to rationalize the positive long run
ination target in a growing economy. Arato (2009) develops an endogenous growth
model with endogenous contract duration and explores the growth e¤ect of ination
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but does not specically address the issue of welfare maximizing ination target. On
the other hand, the novelty of our paper is that we use a simple New Keynesian
endogenous growth model and after factoring into account the positive and negative
e¤ects of trend ination on steady state welfare, we nd that the welfare maximizing
trend ination is still positive and for a plausible price setting environment, it comes
close to what we observe in the real world.
3. Basic Setup
We lay out a simple New-Keynesian model with three players: rms, households
and the Central Bank. There is a continuum of intermediate goods rms in the
economy in the unit interval. Each variety (j) of such goods is produced with a
linear technology as follows:
xjt = Akjt (1)
where xjt is the amount produced of such good, kjt the capital used in the production
and A is a productivity parameter. The linear technology (AK type as in Rebelo,
1991) is the vehicle of endogenous growth. Each variety is produced by a rm with
a patent right which disallows the entry of new rms to replicate this variety. Final
goods rms transform these intermediate goods into the production of nal goods
(yt) using the CES aggregator:
yt =
24 1Z
0
x
( 1)=
jt dj
35

( 1)
: (2)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
The household owns the capital and all the rms. It rents capital to intermediate
goods rms for production. There is no aggregate risk in this environment. The
representative households maximization problem is given by:
Max
1X
t=0
tu(ct)
6
s.t.
Ptct + Pt(kt+1   (1  )kt) +Bt+1 (3)
= (1 + it)Bt +Rtkt +Dt
and the usual solvency condition, limT !1
Tu0(ct+T )
u0(ct)
Bt+T
Pt+T
 0 for all t. Notations
are: t=time, ct=per capita real consumption, Pt =nominal price, kt=average capital
stock, Bt=stock of nominal one period discount bonds in zero net supply, it =nominal
interest rate, Rt = nominal rental price of capital, Dt =nominal prot from the in-
termediate goods rms,  is the fractional rate of depreciation and  is the subjective
discount factor in the unit interval.4
The Euler equations of the household are given by:
kt+1: u
0(ct) = u0(ct+1)(1 + rt+1   ) (4)
Bt+1 : u
0(ct) = u0(ct+1)(1 + it+1)(Pt=Pt+1) (5)
where rt is the real rental price of capital equal to Rt=Pt:
Using (4) and (5) one obtains:
(1 + it+1) = (1 + rt+1   )(Pt+1=Pt) (6)
The Central Bank (CB) sets a long run target  (i.e., trend ination) that
satises the arbitrage condition (6). This means that along a balanced growth path
the CB sets an interest rate as follows:
1 + i = (1 + r   )
4The long run property of the model is invariant to external habit formation and investment
adjustment cost, which we ignore for simplicity.
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3.1. Equilibrium and Balanced Growth
In equilibrium, agents optimize which means that the rst order conditions (4)
and (5) hold. All markets clear meaning, ct + kt+1   (1   )kt = yt and Bt = 0.
Using the households Euler equation (4) and assuming a logarithmic utility function,
u(ct)=ln ct, one obtains the balanced growth rate, G:
G = (1 + r   ) (7)
Because of the linearity of intermediate goods technology (1), the nal output pro-
duction function (2) takes a Rebelo (1991) type "Ak" form with k as the average
capital. Since there is no diminishing return to reproducible input, it means that
the growth is self-sustained. The balanced growth, G thus depends on the steady
state rental price of capital, r. The exact relationship between the trend ination
and the steady state rental price depends on the nature of the price formation which
we discuss later.
Finally, to accommodate this balanced growth (G) and the ination target (),
the CB lets the money supply grow at a rate G:
3.2. Calvo Model
We now turn to the price setting scenario of Calvo (1983). In this model, all
intermediate goods rms facing the same technology are ex ante identical. Each
period a rm receives a random "price change" signal with a probability 1 : In the
spirit of Yun (1996), if the intermediate goods rm does not receive a price signal,
its price is increased at the steady state rate of ination () subject to an ination
indexation parameterized by  2 (0; 1). Lower  means less indexation. This partial
ination indexation formulation is borrowed from Smets and Wouters (2003).
The cost minimization from the nal goods sector yields the conditional input
demand functions:
xjt =

Pjt
Pt
 
yt (8)
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where Pjt = Pjt 1 if j 2 (0; ) and Pjt = P t otherwise. Pt is the general price
level at date t:
Firms solve the optimal price setting problem:
Max
1P
k=0
kMt;t+k(
kP t xt+kjt   TCt+kjt(xt+kjt))
subject to the demand functions,
xt+kjt =

kP t
Pt+k
 
yt+k
where Mt;t+k is the rms nominal discount factor and TCt+kjt is the price setters
forecast of the nominal total cost at time t + k conditional on the information at
date t.
The optimal price (P t ) is nonstationary and thus it is normalized by the general
price level Pt. It is straightforward to verify that:
P t
Pt
= (

   1)
1P
k=0
( )kMt;t+k+1t;t+kmct;t+k(
yt+k
yt
)
1P
k=0
((1 ))kMt;t+kt;t+k(
yt+k
yt
)
(9)
where mct;t+k is the k-period ahead forecast of the real marginal cost. Given the
linear production function (1), mct;t+k = rt;t+k=A where rt;t+k is the k-period ahead
forecast of the real rental price of capital, wheremct;t+k is the k-period ahead forecast
of the real marginal cost. Given the linear production function (1), mct;t+k = rt;t+k=A
where rt;t+k is the k-period ahead forecast of the real rental price of capital.
The law of motion of the general price level is given by:
Pt =

(Pt 1)1  + (1  )P 1 t
 1
1  (10)
Based on the same principle as in King andWolman (1996), one gets the following
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expression for the average markup along the balanced growth path (BGP).5
Pt
MCt
=

P t
MCt

Pt
P t

= n

Pt
P t

(11)
where MCt is the nominal marginal cost. Using (9), n is the marginal markup
dened as
n =

   1

1  (1 )( 1)
1  (1 )

(12)
and based on (10), the price adjustment gap, Pt=P t is given by:
Pt
P t
=

1  (1 )( 1)
1  
1=( 1)
(13)
Higher trend ination erodes the markup in a world with imperfect ination indexa-
tion as seen from the price adjustment gap term (13). To combat this, price setting
rm raises the marginal markup.6 As in King and Wolman (1996), the e¤ect of a
higher trend ination on the average markup is thus ambiguous due to the conicting
e¤ects on the marginal markup and the price adjustment gap.
The ambiguous e¤ect of trend ination on average markup could potentially give
rise to a hump shaped relationship between the long run growth and trend ination.
This happens because the balanced growth (7) is driven by the real rental price of
capital (r) which equals A:mc: Since the real marginal cost, mc is the reciprocal of
the average markup Pt=MCt; a higher trend ination has an ambiguous e¤ect on the
balanced growth rate.7
5The appendix provides a derivation of (11). For the steady state average markup to exist one
needs the convergence condition that  < 
1
( 1) which is 5.8% for the baseline parameter values.
This upper limit accords well with Bakshi et al. (2007) although their model is very di¤erent from
ours.
6The appendix shows that @n=@ > 0 as long as  > 1.
7While King and Wolman (1996) focus on the conicting output e¤ects of trend ination, in our
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3.3. Rotemberg Model
In Rotemberg (1982) all rms continuously adjust prices but all of them are
subject to a quadratic price adjustment cost measured in terms of nal goods. We
follow Ascari and Rossi (2012) and Ireland (2007) in specifying the price adjustment
cost function subject to imperfect ination indexation as follows:
'
2

Pjt
Pjt 1
  1
2
yt (14)
where ' > 0 is the degree of nominal rigidity,  represents the indexation of the
last period price level based on the trend ination, ; and  is the degree of price
indexation as before.
The optimal price xing problem of each intermediate goods rm is, therefore,
Max
1X
k=0
Mt;t+k
"
Pjt+kxj+k  MCt+kxjt+k   '
2

Pjt
Pjt 1
  1
2
Pt+kyt+k
#
(15)
subject to the same sequence of demand functions as in (8). Since all rms face the
same technology and the same price adjustment costs, there is no heterogeneity in
price xing behaviour as in Calvo. Thus in a symmetric equilibrium Pjt = Pt for all
j. Unlike Calvo (1983), there is no di¤erence between average and marginal markup
because all rms charge the same price. Along the BGP, the average markup is given
by (the proof is relegated to the appendix):
Pt
MCt
=

'(1  )1 (1    1)

+
   1

 1
(16)
Higher trend ination () lowers the markup due to imperfect ination indexation.
Since the steady state rental price (r) is A:mc, this means that a higher trend ina-
tion unambiguously raises the balanced growth rate in the Rotemberg price setting
model the trend ination has similar ambiguous e¤ect in determining the long run growth. The
positive e¤ect is likely to prevail at a low trend ination.
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scenario.8
3.4. Long run Welfare in Calvo and Rotemberg Models
For any arbitrary balanced growth (G), the steady state welfare (W ) function is
given by:
W =
ln c0
1   +
 lnG
(1  )2 (17)
where c0 is the initial consumption.
The initial consumption (c0) and the balanced growth rate (G) di¤er between
Calvo and Rotemberg price setting regimes. Hereafter, we distinguish between these
two regimes with superscripts C and R respectively. Using (11) and noting that
r = A:mc, the balanced growth rate (7) in the Calvo scenario is given by:9
GC = 
"
A

n
Pt
P t
 1
+ 1  
#
(18)
and the initial consumption (the proof is relegated to the appendix) is given by
cC0 = [(As
 1 + 1  ) GC ] (19)
where
 
s is the steady state price dispersion given by,10
 
s =
(1  (1 )( 1))=( 1)
(1  (1 ))(1  )1=( 1) (20)
The steady state welfare depends on the long run ination rate () through two
channels: (i) the balanced growth (G), and (ii) relative price dispersion channel (
 
s).
The trend ination has ambiguous e¤ect on growth due to conict between marginal
8Note that growth cannot indenitely rise because a lower markup depresses the prots of the
intermediate goods rms which adversely a¤ects households consumption.
9Further details of the derivation of the steady state welfare functions are relegated to the
appendix.
10See the appendix for the derivation of the steady state price dispersion.
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markup and price adjustment e¤ects. On the other hand, a higher trend ination
elevates the steady state price dispersion along the same channel described in Ascari
and Sbordone (2014).11 Although this depresses the initial consumption via the
rst term of (19), the ambiguous ination e¤ects on growth makes the sign of the
comparative statics @cC0 =@ ambiguous. The overall e¤ect of trend ination on long
run welfare is thus ambiguous in the Calvo model.
For the Rotemberg model, the balanced growth rate (7) is obtained by plugging
(16) into (7):
GR = 

A

'(1  )1 (1    1)

+
   1


+ 1  

(21)
and the initial consumption (the derivation is relegated to the appendix) is given by:
cR0 = [(A(1  ) + 1  ) GR]k0 (22)
where
 =
'
2
 
1    12 (23)
Since all rms are homogeneous, there is no price dispersion in the Rotemberg model.
Instead of price dispersion, the price adjustment cost acts as an implicit tax on TFP.
Higher trend ination has a hump shaped e¤ect on the steady state welfare in the
Rotemberg model due to the conicting e¤ect of trend ination on the steady state
welfare. First, it unambiguously promotes growth, GR which has a direct positive
e¤ect on the steady state welfare via the second term in (17). Second, it has a
negative e¤ect on the welfare via the initial consumption term, cR0 term (22) which
falls because of a higher implicit tax () on output as well as a higher growth, GR.
11See the appendix for a proof.
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4. Calibration
To assess the relationship between W and  quantitatively, we x  = 0:99 and
 = 0:025 at the conventional levels. The demand elasticity parameter  is xed
at 6:00 as in Kollmann (2002). The productivity parameter A is xed to target
the long run per capita quarterly real GDP growth rate at 0.49% which means
an annualized growth rate of 1.97% for the sample period 1947-2014.12 There is
considerable disagreement in the literature about the range of values for the price
stickiness parameter, : Kollmann (2002) uses 0.75 as the baseline value while Smets
and Wouters (2003) estimate a higher value of  around 0.91: These values basically
mean that the average duration of prices to remain sticky is 4 to 10 quarters. We
take an average of these extreme values and set  equal to 0.85 as a baseline.
A similar ambiguity arises about the size of the ination indexation parameter :
For Euro regions, Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate  around 0.52. Using GMM
approach Sahuc (2004) comes up with an estimate of  around 0.41 for Euro regions
and 0.64 for the US. As a baseline we start o¤with a conservative estimate,  = 0:52
which is close to Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate or an average of the Euro and
US estimates of Sahuc (2004). We then carry out a sensitivity analysis to check how
the optimal long run ination depends on the size of .
It is di¢ cult to nd an estimate of the price adjustment cost parameter, ', that is
consistent with our growth model. Keen and Wang (2005) calibrate this by matching
the slopes of the New Keynesian Phillips curves from Calvo and Rotemberg models.
In our context, balanced growth rate is a crucial link between Calvo and Rotemberg
models. In a similar vein, we calibrate ' by matching the balanced growth rates, GC
and GR which yields an analytical expression for ' as follows:
' =


   1n
Pt
P t

     1

 

(1  )1 (1    1)

(24)
The price adjustment cost parameter depends nonlinearly on the trend ination :
12Data for annual per capita real GDP in chained 2009 US dollars came from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
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As a baseline we evaluate ' at a zero ination level which yields13:
' =

   1
1  


1    

1  

(25)
Note that ' is increasing in  and not surprisingly at zero ination steady state,
ination indexation parameter,  plays no role in determining '. For our calibrated
values of ;  and , the price adjustment cost parameter, ' equals 178:76: This value
is close to Keen and Wang (2005) for a price markup in the range 10 to 20% and
Calvo nominal rigidity parameter  around 0.8.14
Figure 1 plots the growth e¤ect of trend ination for the Calvo model where
both growth and ination rates are annualized. The hump shaped relationship arises
which bears out the intuition described earlier about the conict between marginal
markup e¤ect and price adjustment e¤ect caused by a higher trend ination. The
positive price adjustment e¤ect dominates rst and then the marginal markup e¤ect
picks up. The growth maximizing ination is around 1.49%.
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Figure 1: Growth E¤ects of Ination in the Calvo Model
13The expression for ' in eq (25) comes from an application of LHosptials rule to (24).
14The balanced growth rate in our calibrated Rotemberg model is not very sensitive to the value
of ':
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Figure 2 plots the welfare e¤ect of annualized trend ination in the Calvo model.
A welfare maximizing ination results around 0.52% after balancing the negative
price distortion e¤ects and the hump-shaped e¤ects of trend ination on growth. Not
surprisingly the welfare maximizing ination is lower than the growth maximizing
ination because of an additional negative price distortionary e¤ect on the steady
state welfare.
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Figure 2: Welfare maximizing ination in the Calvo model
Figure 3 plots the e¤ect of trend ination on the balanced growth in the Rotem-
berg model. Since the average price markup unambiguously decreases due to higher
ination, the steady state rental price rises which promotes growth unambiguously.
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Figure 3: Growth E¤ects of Ination in the Rotemberg Model
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Figure 4: Welfare e¤ects of trend ination in the Rotemberg model
Figure 4 plots the e¤ect of trend ination on the steady state welfare in the
Rotemberg model. A hump shaped relationship again emerges which picks at 1.08%.
The welfare maximizing ination in Rotemberg model is higher than the Calvo model.
In both models, the growth at the welfare maximizing ination is 1.96% on par with
the annual growth rate in the US.
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To understand the reasons for the higher optimal long run ination in Rotemberg
model compared to Calvo, we compute the ine¢ ciency in both models due to nominal
rigidity. In the Calvo model the e¢ ciency loss arises due to the price dispersion, s
as shown in (20). In the appendix, we demonstrate that the steady state implicit
tax on TFP due to price dispersion is given by (
 
s   1)= s: On the other hand, in the
Rotemberg model the e¢ ciency loss arises due to the price adjustment cost which
results in an implicit steady state tax on TFP equal to '
2
(1    1)2 as seen from
(22) and (23). Figure 5 plots the ratio of these two implicit taxes in Calvo and
Rotemberg for a range of annualized trend ination rates. Higher trend ination
unambiguously raises the ine¢ ciency in the Calvo model compared to Rotemberg.
This progressive relative output loss in the Calvo model vis-a-vis Rotemberg is at
the very foundation of a higher optimal long run ination in the Rotemberg model.
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Figure 5: Relative output loss in Calvo vs Rotemberg due to nominal rigidity
Table 1 demonstrates the sensitivity of the welfare maximizing ination with
respect to  and  for these two models, C and R. The welfare maximizing ination
is sensitive to the ination indexation parameter, . A higher indexation raises
the optimal ination because it dampens the negative distortionary e¤ect of trend
ination on welfare in both Calvo and Rotemberg models (see eqs (20) and (23)).
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For  = 0:87, the Calvo model reproduces an optimal trend ination around 2%. For
the Rotemberg model, the 2% target ination is obtained for a smaller value of 
around 0.74. The optimal ination is not very sensitive to change in the value of the
price rigidity parameter  except for high values exceeding 0.9. The less sensitivity
of the trend ination to  reects the fact that the Calvo price rigidity parameter
generates primarily short run e¤ects of monetary policy.
A 2% long run ination target is, therefore, obtained for a value of the ination
indexation parameter  higher than standard estimates in the literature. Is such a
high value of  empirically plausible? As discussed earlier, in the extant literature
the rule of indexation varies a lot and it is often based on ad hoc estimates. Del
Negro et al. (2012) uses a hybrid indexation rule that makes indexation a weighted
average of last period ination and the trend ination. Carrillo et al. (2015) nd
that the size of the indexation rule depends on the predominant source of the shock
in a structural model. During the great ination periods, the indexation was close
to 0.89 while during the great moderation period, it is close to zero. Although these
numbers are not directly comparable to our long run framework, it at least indicates
that there is no clear conventional wisdom of the exact degree of ination indexation.
The most relevant study in our context is by Ascari and Branzoli (2010) who
make a persuasive case that the optimal ination indexation in the presence of a
positive trend ination could be quite high. Their theoretical estimate of  is 0.87
that is remarkably close to the estimate of  for which the Calvo model reproduces
a 2 percent ination. It is also noteworthy that in our model, a high value of  is
associated with a relatively high value of the degree of competition parameter, .
We next show that a 2 percent optimal ination can be obtained for a lower value of
 if  is calibrated at a lower level.
<Table 1 comes here>
4.1. Degree of Competition and the Optimal Ination
How does the optimal trend ination depend on the degree of competition para-
meter ? A lower  raises the exible price markup. In the Calvo model, a lower 
raises the marginal markup (12) but it lowers the price adjustment gap (13) making
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the growth e¤ect ambiguous. A similar ambiguity arises in the Rotemberg growth
rate (21) because a change in  has conicting e¤ects on the rst and second terms
of the average markup (16). After factoring these conicting growth e¤ects into ac-
count, the optimal trend ination in both models, however, still rises as  falls. Table
2 summarizes the result of this sensitivity analysis. In the Calvo model, the optimal
trend ination of 2 percent is achieved for  equal to 2.25 while in the Rotemberg
model, it is reproduced when  is 4.44.
<Table 2 comes here>
The upshot of all this sensitivity analysis in both Tables 1 and 2 is that the Calvo
model always falls short in reproducing a 2 percent trend ination target vis-a-vis
Rotemberg for reasonable parameter values. The low optimal trend ination in Calvo
basically reects the greater ine¢ ciency due to price distortion explained earlier in
terms of Figure 5.
4.2. Why do nominal frictions ine¢ ciency persist in the long run?
The conventional wisdom is that all prices and quantities exibly adjust in the
long run and thus no ine¢ ciency due to nominal frictions persist in the long run. In
our model, the principal driver of nominal friction is partial ination indexation in
the long run. If  equals one, both Calvo and Rotemberg pricing models revert to a
exible price model as seen from (11) and (16). The question is: what is the rationale
for assuming partial ination indexation in the long run? We follow the reasoning of
Ascari and Branzoli (2010) that neither zero nor full ination indexation is optimal in
the long run in a staggered price setting environment with a positive trend ination.
Ascari and Branzoli (2010) focus on the Calvo price setting without growth and
argue that a lower  has conicting e¤ects on the price adjustment gap (Pt=P t ) and
marginal markup (n). A similar reasoning applies to our growth model. A higher
indexation has conicting e¤ects on long run growth via tensions on the steady state
rental price of capital. In addition, in our model, the steady state welfare e¤ect of
indexation is further complicated by the fact that a lower indexation elevates the
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price distortion in the Calvo setting which depresses initial consumption (CC0 ).
15
Ascari and Branzoli do not analyze the case of Rotemberg price setting model. It
is straightforward to verify that a lower  also raises the price adjustment cost term
(14). Thus by lowering average markup (16), it unambiguously raises the balanced
growth rate. On the other other hand, the initial consumption (CR0 ) falls because
a lower  raises  via a higher price adjustment cost. These conicting e¤ects on
growth and initial consumption make the e¤ect of a higher indexation on long run
welfare ambiguous in the Rotemberg model. Thus neither zero nor full ination
indexation is optimal also in the Rotemberg model.
4.3. Why is positive trend ination welfare improving?
In both Calvo and Rotemberg models price distortions either in the form of
price dispersion or price adjustment cost give rise to misallocation of resources. The
question arises: why does not the Central Bank eliminate this distortion right at
the outset by setting the trend ination equal to zero? Setting trend ination to
zero would eliminate the nominal friction and lead the economy to a exible price
steady state which is still subject to real friction arising from market imperfection.
Such a steady state is, therefore, an ine¢ cient steady state due to the existence of
market imperfection. If one compares a zero ination ine¢ cient steady state with
an ine¢ cient steady state with a small dose of trend ination, the latter could be
welfare improving. To see this more clearly rst note that the real rental price in a
exible price ine¢ cient steady state is given by A(   1)=. The reciprocal of the
exible price markup imposes a tax on the TFP. The immediate consequence is that
the balanced growth is given by:
G = (A(   1)= + 1  ) (26)
As seen from Figures 1 and 3, a positive trend ination up to a threshold could
improve the long run growth rate in both Calvo and Rotemberg models compared
15A full blown analysis of an optimal ination indexation in our present endogenous growth
setting requires endogenizing  which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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to a exible price ine¢ cient balanced growth rate as in (26).
The welfare comparison is less straightforward. To compare the steady state
welfare between zero and positive ination ine¢ cient steady states, we need to rst
derive the steady state welfare function for the exible price steady state. Given our
log-utility function and the linear production function, the optimal consumption and
investment rules in a exible price steady state are given by the Solow saving rules
as follows:
kt+1 = (A(   1)= + 1  )kt (27)
and
ct =

A(1     1

) + (1  )(1  )

kt (28)
The appendix outlines the derivations of (27) and (28). Plugging the consumption
decision rule (28) and the balanced growth (26) into the welfare function (17) and
normalizing the initial capital stock (k0) to unity one gets
W flex =
ln
h
A(1   ( 1)

) + (1  )(1  )
i
1   +
 lnG
(1  )2
where W flex represents the steady state welfare in an ine¢ cient exible price econ-
omy. For the baseline values of the parameters, we nd that W flex =  353:0095:
In the Calvo model, as seen from Figure 2 the steady state welfare at the optimal
ination is  352:9894 and for the Rotemberg model, the same is  352:9696 as seen
from Figure 4: Thus a exible price zero ination steady state welfare is lower than a
positive ination steady state welfare for our calibrated economy. The policy author-
ity can do better in inating the economy a bit compared to a zero ination exible
price steady state.16
16In our present setting the real imperfection due to the existence of monopolistic market power is
mitigated by a small dose of ination. Alternatively one can think of a production subsidy nanced
by lump sum taxation as in Gali (2015) to eliminate this ine¢ ciency. Although this remains a
theoretical possibility there may be practical issues of implementability of such production subsidy.
In this paper, we abstract from such scal subsidy.
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5. Conclusion
The ination targets of the major industrial nations are consistently above zero
which goes against the conventional wisdom of zero or negative ination based on
welfare theoretic considerations. We set up a new-Keynesian endogenous growth
model to address this apparent anomaly. Due to partial ination indexation, a higher
long run ination gives rise to opposing e¤ects on welfare via its conciting e¤ects
on growth and price distortion. An optimal ination rate exists which maximizes
the long run aggregate welfare. For plausible parameter values we nd that this
optimal ination rate is positive. The level of this ination depends on the nature of
price setting in the model. The welfare maximizing ination is consistently higher
in the Rotemberg model compared to Calvo due to greater ine¢ ciency in the latter
caused by price dispersion. A future extension of this paper would be to examine
the short run implications of ination targets in the presence of aggregate shocks.
In this paper, we have focused only on Calvo and Rotemberg price setting scenarios.
Another possible avenue of extension would be to investigate the implications of a
more generalized pricing rule such as state dependent pricing as in Sheedy (2010).
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A. Appendix
Derivation of equation (11)
Assuming a logarithmic utility function of the form u (ct+k) = ln (ct+k), the nom-
inal discount factor (9) can be written as:
Mt;t+k = 
k

ct
ct+k

Pt
Pt+k

(A.1)
which can be written along the BGP as:
M =


G
k
(A.2)
Along the BGP, the numerator of (9) ; mc
1P
k=0
((1 ))k = mc
1 (1 ) and
the denominator is
1P
k=0
 
( 1)(1 )
k
= 1
1 ( 1)(1 ) .
Thus along the BGP, the optimal price setting equation reduces to:
P t
Pt
=


   1

1  ( 1)(1 )
1  (1 )

mc
which implies
Pt
MCt
= n
Pt
P t
same as (11).
Derivation of @ lnn
@
> 0
We have
n =

   1

1  (1 )( 1)
1  (1 )

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Therefore,
lnn = ln


   1

+ ln
 
1  (1 )( 1)  ln  1  (1 )
Next note that for  > 1,
@ lnn
@
=
(1  )(1 ) 1
1  (1 )  
(1  )(   1)(1 )( 1) 1
1  (1 )( 1) > 1
Derivation of (16)
The rst order condition for this price setting problem (15) of the jth intermediate
goods rm yields:
(1  )

Pjt
Pt
 
yt +
rt
A


Pjt
Pt
  1
yt   'Pt

Pjt
Pjt 1
  1

yt
Pjt 1
+

u0(ct+1)
u0(ct)
'Pt

 
Pjt+1
Pjt
  1

 Pjt+1P 2jt yt+1 = 0 (A.3)
Since all rms are homogeneous, they charge the same price in a symmetric
equilibrium which means Pjt = Pt. Eq (A.3) thus reduces to
(1 )yt+ rt
A
yt 't


t

  1

yt+
u0(ct+1)
u0(ct)
' t
 
 t   1

yt+1 = 0 (A.4)
Along the BGP, t = , rt = r and
yt+1
yt
= ct+1
ct
= G. With log utility, eq (A.4)
reduces to
r
A
=

'(1  )1 (1    1)

+
   1


Since r
A
= mct =
MCt
Pt
, from the above equation the steady state average mark
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up can be expressed as
Pt
MCt
=

'(1  )1 (1    1)

+
   1

 1
which is equation (16).
Derivation of the steady state welfare function for Calvo and Rotem-
berg models
Along the BGP the steady state welfare can be written as:
W =
1X
t=0
t ln c0G
t (A.5)
=
ln c0
1   +
 lnG
(1  )2
The equilibrium resource constraint (3) facing the household is given by:
ct + kt+1   (1  )kt = rtkt + dt (A.6)
Dividing through by kt and using the balanced growth condition:
ct
kt
+G = (r + 1  ) + dt
kt
(A.7)
To derive the expression for (19), rst aggregate the capital of all rms as:
kt =
Z 1
0
kjtdj
Using (1) and (8):
kt = ytA
 1
Z 1
0

Pjt
Pt
 
dj
= ytA
 1st
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The nal goods production function thus reduces to:
yt = As
 1
t kt
which means that the implicit tax on output is (st   1)=st. Next note that the
dividend in the Calvo model is given by:
dt = yt   rtkt
= As 1t kt   rtkt
= (As 1t   rt)kt
which implies
dt
kt
= (As 1t   rt)
In the steady state st = s which means that
ct
kt
+GC = (r + 1  ) + dt
kt
=> ct
kt
= (r + 1  ) GC + (As 1   r) = (1 

)GC +
(As 1   r):
From (A.7) this implies (given the normalization k0 = 1):
cC0 = [(As
 1 + 1  ) GC ] (A.8)
An expression for s is derived the following section.
For the Rotemberg model, along the BGP the dividend is given by
dt
kt
= (A(1  )  r)
where  is given by (23). From (A.7) this implies (given the normalization k0 = 1)
cR0 = [(A(1  ) + 1  ) GR]
Derivation of (20)
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We follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011). Dene the price dispersion as:
st =
1Z
0

Pjt
Pt
 
dj (A.9)
(A.9) can be rewritten as a recursion as:
st = 
 t st 1 + (1  )

P t
Pt
 
(A.10)
Plugging t =  and (13) into (A.10), we get the following steady state price dis-
persion (subject to the same convergence condition in footnote 4):
s =
(1  (1 )( 1))=( 1)
(1  (1 ))(1  )1=( 1) (A.11)
Check that
@ ln s
@
=
(1  )(1 )(1   1)
(1  (1 ))(1  (1 )( 1)) > 0 if  > 1 (A.12)
The denominator is positive given that the convergence condition holds.
Derivation of (27) and (28)
In a exible price steady state with log utility, the rental Euler equation (4) can
be written as:
1
ct
= 

1 + r   
ct+1

(A.13)
where
r =

   1


A
We make the following conjectures for the optimal consumption and investment
policy rules:
ct = (A+ 1  )kt
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and
kt+1 = (1  )(A+ 1  )kt
Plugging these conjectures in the Euler equation in (A.13), we can solve  as
 =
A(1    1

) + (1  )(1  )
A+ 1  
which yields (27) and (28).
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Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis of the Optimal Ination Rate in Calvo and Rotemberg Models (in
percent)
 = 0:75  = 0:80  = 0:85  = 0:90  = 0:95
 = 0:00
C = 0.26
R = 0.52
C = 0.26
R = 0.52
C = 0.26
R = 0.52
C = 0.26
R = 0.52
C = 0.25
R = 0.51
 = 0:20
C = 0.33
R = 0.65
C = 0.33
R = 0.65
C = 0.32
R = 0.65
C = 0.32
R = 0.65
C = 0.31
R = 0.64
 = 0:40
C = 0.44
R = 0.87
C = 0.44
R = 0.87
C = 0.43
R = 0.87
C = 0.43
R = 0.87
C = 0.41
R = 0.85
 = 0:50
C = 0.52
R = 1.05
C = 0.52
R = 1.05
C = 0.52
R = 1.01
C = 0.51
R = 1.01
C = 0.49
R = 1.01
 = 0:60
C = 0.66
R = 1.31
C = 0.65
R = 1.31
C = 0.65
R = 1.31
C = 0.64
R = 1.30
C = 0.61
R = 1.27
 = 0:70
C = 0.87
R = 1.73
C = 0.88
R = 1.73
C = 0.87
R = 1.73
C = 0.86
R = 1.73
C = 0.82
R = 1.27
 = 0:74
C = 1.01
R = 2.02
C = 1.00
R = 2.02
C =1.00
R = 2.02
C = 0.99
R = 2.02
C = 0.95
R = 1.97
 = 0:80
C = 1.31
R = 2.63
C = 1.31
R = 2.63
C = 1.30
R = 2.63
C = 1.29
R = 2.63
C = 1.23
R = 2.57
 = 0:87
C = 2.03
R = 4.06
C = 2.02
R = 4.06
C = 2.01
R = 4.06
C = 1.99
R = 4.06
C = 1.90
R = 3.97
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Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis of the Optimal Ination Rate in Calvo and Rotemberg Models (in
percent) with respect to markup
 = 2
C = 2.27
R = 4.06
 = 2:25
C = 2.00
R = 4.06
 = 3
C = 1.42
R = 4.06
 = 4
C = 0.97
R = 2.48
 = 4:44
C = 0.84
R = 2.00
 = 5
C = 0.71
R = 1.57
 = 6
C = 0.54
R = 1.09
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